Practical Mysticism in Islam and Christianity offers a comparative study of the works of the Sufi-poet Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207-1273) and the practical teachings of the German Dominican, Meister Eckhart (c1260-1327/8). Rumi has remained an influential figure in Islamic mystical discourse since the thirteenth century, while also extending his impact to the Western spiritual arena. However, his ideas have frequently been interpreted within the framework of other mystical, philosophical, or religious systems. Through its novel approach, this book aims to reformulate (...) Rumi's practical mysticism by employing four methodological principles: a) mysticism is a coherent structure with mutual interconnection between its parts; b) the imposition of alien structures to interpret any particular mysticism damages its inward coherency; c) practical mysticism consists of two main parts, namely practices and stages; and d) the proper use of comparative methodology enables a deeper understanding of each juxtaposed system. Eckhart's speculative mysticism, which differs from and enjoys similarities with the love-based mysticism of Rumi, provides a "mirror" that highlights the special features of Rumi's practical mysticism. Such comparison also allows a deeper comprehension of Eckhart's practical thought. Offering a critical examination of practical mysticism, this book is a valuable resource for students and scholars of Islamic studies, comparative mysticism, and the intellectual history of Islam. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTwo rival scholars from Shiraz in Persia, Dawānī and Dashtakī engaged in a bitter and extended dispute over a range of metaphysical and logical issues. One of these was the liar paradox. Their debate on this point marked the most extensive scrutiny of the paradox in Arabic until that time. Dashtakī’s solution was to deny that the statement ‘What I say is false’ is true or false, on the ground that there is one statement and one application of the falsity (...) predicate. Given that – ex hypothesi – there is no other statement, there is no basis for a reiteration of the truth or falsity predicate and describing the statement itself as true or false. Dawānī’s solution was to deny that ‘What I say is false’ is a statement at all, and he argued that it is instead akin to a performative utterance such as ‘I hereby sell you this’. (shrink)

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should be no possibility of this (...) knowledge to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

Introduces young readers to Ibn Sina, telling his story as he might tell it himself. It provides a fascinating glimpse into the life of this philosopher, scientist and physician who was one of the greatest thinkers of his time.

In this work the Persian and English texts are edited and published together for the first time. This is Tusi’s major Ismaili work and the most important primary source on Ismaili doctrines during the Alamut period.

We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of (...) freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Mystik gilt im interreligiösen Dialog als diejenige Dimension von Religion, die gemäß dem Essentialismus den gemeinsamen Kern der Religionen darstellt. In Unterschied dazu vertritt der Kontextualismus die These, dass Mystik nur in spezifischen religiösen Kontexten entsteht und so seine unverwechselbare Eigenheit erhält. Saeed Zarrabi-Zadeh vergleicht in seiner Arbeit Meister Eckhart und Rumi methodisch so miteinander, dass er die jeweiligen Stärken des Essentialismus und des Kontextualismus nutzt und ihre Schwächen vermeidet. Auf der Grundlage dieses methodischen Neuansatzes und eines weitgefassten Mystikbegriffs, (...) der Ethik, Praxis, Spekulation und Dogmatik umfasst, kommt er zu neuen Differenzierungen im religionsphänomenologischen Vergleich und legt zugleich erhebliche Differenzen im theologischen Deutehorizont der jeweiligen Mystiker offen. Darüberhinaus arbeitet er mit seiner Interpretation der. (shrink)

Acknowledgements -- List of illustrations -- Table of transliteration -- Introduction: Shams al-Din Samarqandi: his life and training -- Works and thought -- Science of the cosmos and the soul ('Ilm al-afaq wa al-anfus) -- Manuscripts used in preparing this edition -- Sources -- Persian and Arabic texts [1-287].

This is a major work of Islamic mysticism by the great thirteenth-century Persian poet, Farid al-Din Attar. Translated by A J Arberry, Attar’s work and thought is set in perspective in a substantial introduction.

This study discusses the classifications of sects in a treatise named Firqa-ye Nājīye, written in Persian by a Shiite scholar in 982/1574. In this treatise, which is in the Merkez-i İḥyâʾi Heritage Library and has no other copy as far as we know, it has been tried to prove that the Twelver Shiʿa is the saved sect (firqa-yi nājiya) through seventy-three sects classification. The author summarized the seven doubts raised by the devil, the first events that caused the Muslim community (...) (umma) to disagree, and the general information about the sects from al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, the classifications of the sects from Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, but reconstructed the data in these texts according to the Shiite understanding. On the other hand, the main reason for writing this treatise is to respond to Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī’s claims rather than the classification of sects. Nasīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī determined a method for the identification of the saved sect as "differentiating from all sects in matters of theology". He claimed that the Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from the other sects in all matters of theology and was therefore the saved sect. Davānī stated that Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from other sects only with the belief in imamate, which is not the subject of creed, and that it generally agrees with Mu'tazila in other creeds, thus claiming that Tusi's claim is baseless. He also said that, when considered through the same method, Ashʿarīsm is more worthy of being the saved sect, because this sect differs from all sects in matters related to the creeds. Contrary to Davānī's claim, the author of Firqa-ye Nājīye stated that imamate was one of the most important principles of religion and also claimed that the Twelver Shīʿīsm differed from other sects in matters of creed other than imamate. However, he failed to provide sufficient data to justify this claim. (shrink)

“Maqamat as-Sufiyya” is a small theoretical works of Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi (ab. 1154-1191), the founder of the Philosophy of Illumination. It contains practical instructions and theoretical reflections and proofs. As-Suhrawardi especially notes terminology used by philosophers and terminology used by sufis in “Maqamat as-Sufiyya”.

The appearance of nonlinear equations in science, engineering, economics, and medicine cannot be denied. Solving such equations requires numerical methods having higher-order convergence with cost-effectiveness, for the equations do not have exact solutions. In the pursuit of efficient numerical methods, an attempt is made to devise a modified strategy for approximating the solution of nonlinear models in either scalar or vector versions. Two numerical methods of second-and sixth-order convergence are carefully merged to obtain a hybrid multi-step numerical method with twelfth-order (...) convergence while using seven function evaluations per iteration, resulting in the efficiency index of about 1.4262. The convergence is also ascertained theoretically, and the asymptotic error constant is computed. Furthermore, various numerical methods of varying orders are used to compare the numerical results obtained with the proposed hybrid method in approximate solution, number of iterations, absolute error, absolute functional value, and the machine time measured in seconds. The obtained results outperformed the chosen methods when applied models arising from physical and natural fields were solved. Finally, to observe the convergence graphically, some complex polynomials are plotted as polynomiographs, wherein the rapid convergence of the proposed method is guaranteed. (shrink)

Quʹest-ce que lʹêre? Cette question passe pour fonder la philosophie. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens du mot "être ". L'essence des choses détermine-t-elle leur existence? Devons-nous affirmer, au contraire, que l'existence conditionne l'intensité d'être qui qualifie une certaine réalité? Molla Sadr Shirazi, dans ce traité écrit en Iran au siècle de Descartes et de Leibniz, médite ces questions qui sont encore les nôtres. Mais les solutions qu'il propose s'évadent hors de nos perspectives, après avoir opéré une révolution décisive dans (...) la métaphysique des Orientaux. Penseur shi'ite en butte à la persécution, Molla Sadra est la plus haute figure de la philosophie iranienne islamique au temps splendide de la cour safavide d'Ispahan. Sa doctrine du primat de l'existence, que le présent ouvrage expose complètement, ouvre sur une interprétation spirituelle de la résurrection des corps. Cette traduction par Henry Corbin, qui fut aussi l'éditeur du texte original, a fait événement : par son ample introduction, il situe la question de l'être et déploie une explication comparée de ce que l'Occident grec puis médiéval en ont fait, avec la tradition shi'iite. -- Back cover. (shrink)

The central issue in this work is self-knowledge. The human soul is created in the Image of God with a purpose.

We examine how corporate social responsibility (CSR) perceptions (association and participation) affect manager creativity at the workplace and its mediating link through organisational identification. We collected data from the National Forum of Environment and Health (NFEH) 2019 that awarded 52 companies in Pakistan. NFEH is a purely non-profit, non-governmental, and voluntary organisation registered under the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance 1961. We employed convenience sampling to collect data from managers of 52 CSR performing organisations in Pakistan. We analyse the data (...) with structural equation modelling (SEM) via R. Findings reveal that CSR association does not affect creativity. In contrast, CSR participation has a significant positive effect on manager creative performance. Furthermore, the decomposition analysis indicated that only in the case of CSR participation, OI has a mediating effect. (shrink)